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It is widely agreed that ethics teaching should have an important role in Information Systems (IS) teaching. Yet, there are no 
studies exploring how students apply theories of ethics in their decision-making. This is unfortunate, because teaching ethics is 
of little practical use if the students do not utilise the acquired knowledge in practice. In order to bridge this significant gap in 
the literature, we introduced IS students to the following theories: utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, virtue ethics, prima-facie 
principles, and Rawls' veil of ignorance. We then asked them (n=75) to apply these theories to a given moral conflict, and to 
assess whether they intended to use the theories in real life. Phenomenographic analysis revealed four developing levels in the 
students’ perceptions: 1) rejection (the student trusts his or her intuition, consciousness or feelings rather than the theories); 2) 
latent use (the student recognizes that the theories may be latently present in intuitive deliberation); 3) conscious use (the 
student uses the theories to support intuitive deliberation); and 4) internalised use (the student has internalised the theories to 
such an extent that he or she does need to consciously steer his or her deliberation to their use). These findings entail 
recommendations to IS educators on how to educate students to address ethical issues through the application of theories. 
 






Analytical and critical thinking on matters of ethics and 
professionalism (e.g., codes of conduct and ethical theory) 
has been recognised as an important aspect of IS education 
(Gorgone et al., 2002). As a result, a number of conceptual 
frameworks have been proposed (e.g., Davison, 2000; 
Dyrud, 2002; Martin & Huff, 1997; Tavani, 2001). At the 
core of any such framework lie theories of ethics. Anyone 
teaching these theories to IS students should understand to 
what extent they intend to use them in real-life moral 
conflicts. Having said this, we find no studies purporting to 
address this relevant issue. In fact, the process of decision-
making is rarely touched on in research on computer ethics 
(Adam, 2000). Our aim is to fill this gap in the knowledge by 
investigating the perceived applicability of the theories in 
ethical decision-making. Consequently, we studied IS 
students’ application of five such theories (utilitarianism, 
Kantian ethics, virtue ethics, prima-facie principles, and 
Rawls' veil of ignorance). We asked the students to apply the 
theories to a given moral conflict and to think about whether 
they would use them in real life.  
This paper is organised as follows. The second section 
presents the theoretical framework, the third describes the 
research design and the phenomenographic method used, and 
the fourth presents the results. The fifth section discusses the 
limitations and the significance of the findings, and the sixth 
concludes the paper with a summary of the key points. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This section reviews different theories of ethics, and 
illustrates their applicability to a real-life moral conflict.  
The various theories of ethics include utilitarianism 
(Bentham, 1876; Mill 1895), universal prescriptivism (Hare, 
1981), Kant’s theory (1993), emotivism (Stevenson, 1944), 
intuitionism (Ross, 1930), and virtue ethics. Of these we 
chose to focus on utilitarianism, virtue ethics, intuitionism 
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(Ross’ prima-facie principles), Kant’s ethics and Rawls 
theory of justice (“veil of ignorance”). Following Hare 
(1981), we consider intuitionism and emotivism similar in 
terms of their practical application. Emotivism suggests that 
moral utterances are the expression of emotions, while 
intuitionism holds that our intuitions guide our moral 
decisions. Neither of these theories offers any 
methodological support for finding out moral decisions that 
go beyond emotions or intuitions. Rawls’ “veil of ignorance” 
also bears some resemblance to Hare’s (1981) method of 
‘universalizability of moral judgements’ for deciding moral 
principles (Hare; in Mautner, 1996 p. 177). Hence, we omit 
Hare’ method. 
These selected theories also represent the major 
traditions in ethics (Raphael, 1994), and therefore offer 
students a variety of thinking tools together with knowledge 
of the major ethical principles. We introduce them below, 
with exemplary applications to the following case reported 
by a computer professional to one of the authors: 
“I work as the head administrator of a server and some 
users contacted me wondering why the mailbox reading 
times had magically changed during the night. Because I was 
unable to find any sensible reason, I spied on the other 
administrators to find out what they were up to. I found the 
culprit, an acquaintance, who was ‘peeking’ at girls’ 
mailboxes. I know that the person is a harmless nerd who, in 
my judgment, would not abuse any information he obtained. 
What should I do?” 
 
Utilitarianism: Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), the founder 
of utilitarianism, argued that the important issue in resolving 
moral conflicts was the maximization of utility. The key idea 
behind this is the concept of ‘felicity’ (happiness), which he 
describes as a combination of ‘pleasure’ and ‘the absence of 
pain’. In other words, utilitarianism holds that an act that 
produces the greatest happiness for the greatest number of 
people, measured in terms of ‘pleasure’ and ‘the absence of 
pain’, is a morally right action. Applying utilitarianism to the 
above example, it is a question of which alternative would 
produce the greater increase in happiness (and pain): 
disclosing the administrator’s behaviour to the users or 
refraining from doing so and having a serious discussion 
with him. If disclosing the act to the users produces more 
pain for them and for the administrator, then the act of 
refraining from disclosing and having a serious discussion 
with the administrator is acceptable. A common criticism 
levelled against utilitarianism concerns whether we should 
take into account short-term or long-term results, and if we 
take the long-term view how long a period of time we need 
to cover. In this case, refraining from disclosing the act and 
having a serious discussion might not stop the 
administrator’s future peeking acts, whereas disclosing the 
act and giving a formal warning might prevent future 
wrongdoings. Indeed, it would be difficult to see and 
calculate the long-term implications of either alternative. 
 
Kant’s ethics: The key aspect of Kant’s moral theory is his 
categorical imperative. This consists of two maxims: act only 
on maxims that you would want to be universal laws (the 
thesis of universality), and always treat other people as an 
end, never only as a means (the rule of human dignity). The 
first rule means simply that one should act as if one were 
legislating for everyone. Thus, when you are considering 
whether an action is right or wrong you should ask yourself 
if you would want everyone to act in that way. The second 
rule refers to human dignity. Raphael (1994) stresses that 
"merely as a means" is the way in which we generally treat 
people, although there is nothing necessarily wrong with that 
idea. A simple example serves to illustrate how Kant’s 
universality thesis can be applied to the head administrator’s 
case. When the administrator peeks at others’ emails he is 
using these persons as a means to an end. When the head 
administrator is forced to react to such behaviour he should 
ask whether he would like to live in a society in which 
peeking at someone’s emails was not disclosed to the writer. 
 
Intuitionism: Ross’ prima-facie principles. According to the 
theory of prima-facie duties (Ross, 1930), humans have 
many such duties, which are more or less incumbent on us. 
On some occasions they make conflicting demands on us and 
we have to determine which of them is the most pressing. 
Ross lists at least the following: fidelity, reparation, 
gratitude, non-malfeasance, justice, beneficence, and self-
improvement. The head administrator has obligations to 
users, to guarantee their privacy for example, but he could 
also be seen as having obligations to other administrators in 
terms of loyalty and support. In such a situation he has to 
choose which duty is the most pressing. 
 
Virtue ethics: Under the principles of virtue ethics, when 
faced with an ethical dilemma we need first to ask what kind 
of people we are (or would like to be) in order to select from 
the possible courses of action (Pence, 1993; Macintyre, 
1987; Crisp and Slote, 1997). Virtue theory in itself does not 
equip us with good virtues, but leaves the course of action to 
be chosen by the moral agent him/herself. In our example the 
head administrator could deliberate with himself about what 
kind of human being, or in this instance what kind of 
professional, he is or would like to be. For example, he 
might decide that as a loyal colleague he would like to 
support his colleague, but as a citizen he would like to foster 
privacy in electronic communications. Traditional criticism 
of virtue ethics concerns how we decide what the virtues are, 
and how they could be used to resolve concrete moral 
conflicts. By way of illustration, let us assume that there is a 
situation in which two virtues are in conflict. For example, 
the head administrator may think that he has an obligation to 
the users to disclose the peeking at emails on the one hand, 
but on the other hand he may consider it a virtue to support 
his colleague and to be loyal to him. Hursthouse (1996 p. 19) 
views this as a no-problem dilemma, arguing that virtue 
ethics could be seen as a normative theory providing answers 
to the question of “What should I do?” She suggests that one 
could meet this condition merely by presenting the idea of 
virtue ethics in a different manner: “An action is right if it is 
what a virtuous agent would characteristically (i.e. acting in 
character) do in the circumstances” (ibid. p. 22). This 
response has been criticised for not bringing us any closer to 
the question of how we know what a virtuous agent should 
do in the computer ethics case: is it virtuous to disclose the 
peeking to the users? Hursthouse’s solution is to go and find 
a virtuous person and ask his/her opinion. How do we know 
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who is a virtuous person? For Hursthouse it is someone I 
regard as “… kinder, more honest, more just, and wiser than 
I am myself…” (Hursthouse, 1996 p. 24). In other words, if 
the head administrator were to follow her advice, he would 
try to find a person who was “kinder, more honest, more just, 
and wiser than I am.” Siponen’s (2005) criticism is that 
different people regard different persons as wise: opinions 
may differ on whether we should ask the view of a suicide 
terrorist who kills innocent people or a Buddhist monk, for 
example. He also wonders how we can measure who is more 
just, wise, kind and honest (and should I select the most wise 
or virtuous person, not simply one who is more virtuous than 
I am)? Hursthouse (1996) does not provide any answer to 
this question. Her (ibid. p. 34) claim that two virtuous 
persons (A and B) may view the moral status of the same 
action differently does not help us either. Finally, even if, for 
the sake of argument, we somehow knew that a certain 
person was virtuous, how might we know that he or she was 
right on this particular matter (Siponen, 2005)? Hursthouse 
(1996) seems to insist that someone who has virtuous 
characteristics will act virtuously (or morally correctly) in all 
cases. However, even a virtuous person may err, so how can 
we know that he or she is not making a crucial error this 
time? Hursthouse (ibid. p. 29) also gives another response: 
we can outrank virtues in the case of conflict, but again, this 
does not give us any idea – beyond our intuition - of how to 
carry out such outranking. 
 
Rawls’ theory of justice: “the veil of ignorance”. Rawls 
developed his theory of justice in parts (Rawls, 1958; 1963; 
1967; 1971). The best-known version is presented in Rawls 
(1971), although he has since sought to reply to his critics 
and to further develop his theory (Rawls, 2001). One of his 
key concepts is that of the ‘veil of ignorance’, the aim of 
which is to hide factors that are morally irrelevant. Such 
factors include age, religion, level of physical or intellectual 
ability, economic and social status, and gender, all of which 
may bias our judgment. Because under a ‘veil of ignorance’ 
we are not aware of these factors, we do not know whether 
we are poor, rich, white, black, disabled, male, female, 
young or old. However, behind the veil everyone shares the 
same knowledge of politics, psychology, economics, the 
existence of social inequalities and religious beliefs, for 
instance. In sum, under the veil we ponder on what 
principles of justice we would choose to govern a society in 
which, as members of it, we could be anyone in any position. 
According to Rawls, the process of deciding an issue behind 
a veil of ignorance is fair and just because we are then forced 
to choose impartially because we do not know who we are in 
society. Further, when deciding on the principles to be 
followed each participant has the right of veto. The least 
advantaged parties (e.g., disabled people) are protected 
because no one knows who they will be after the raising of 
the veil: behind it every participant faces the possibility of 
becoming one of the least advantaged. Not only is it used for 
deciding socio-political principles it also has a role in 
resolving moral conflicts (Collins and Miller, 1992; Siponen, 
2005). In this case one could arrange imaginary negotiations 
behind the veil, during which the participants try to reach a 
solution. In our case the head administrator could imagine 
negotiations in which he, the administrator concerned and a 
representative of the user group are present. None of them 
would know their identity in real life under the ‘veil of 
ignorance’: they might just as well be administrators as 
users. Given this situation, they try to achieve a consensus 
related to the privacy issue, and to how users are treated and 
how one should treat one’s colleagues. A possible solution 
that might be accepted by all parties would be as follows. 
Privacy is a significant right of everyone. Therefore, 
everyone – including administrators and users - should 
respect each other’s privacy and if any one is caught 
violating it he or she should be given a warning. If the 
violation continues the violator should be given a stricter 
sanction (e.g., dismissed). This solution takes into account 
reasonableness in sanctions in that the violator would first 
receive a warning before being punished more severely. 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Morality is a complex phenomenon (Packer, 1985, 5). To 
study complex phenomena, interpretive approaches are 
recommended in IS (Walsham 2006). Such approaches and 
methods involve investigation of individuals’ understanding 
of the reality, their subjective meanings and how they 
interact with the world around them (Klein and Myers, 1999, 
69; Trauth, 2001). We thereby give the subjects the 
opportunity to express themselves in their own terms, and do 
not provide them with pre-defined categories as in 
quantitative studies (Patton, 1990, 13). Indeed, interpretive 
approaches allow the possibility of finding something that is 
impossible to identify in quantitative studies (cf. exploratory 
studies). Our objective in this study, therefore, is to 
understand IS students’ use of theories of ethics in real life. 
In order to achieve this, we provided them with open-ended 
tasks and analyzed their responses from an interpretative 
perspective: in other words we used the phenomenographic 
method, which was developed for studying people’s 
understanding of specific phenomena. In the following we 
present the principles behind the data collection, and 
describe the method and how it was used in the research. We 
then show how we applied it in our analyses of the students’ 
perceptions. 
 
3.1 Educational intervention and data gathering 
The chosen theories of ethics (Section 2) were introduced to 
the students during a two-hour lecture, after which a 
qualitative questionnaire was administered. The 
questionnaire consisted of a description of an authentic 
moral conflict (the same one that was used as an example in 
Section 2) and instructions for resolving it according to the 
principles of utilitarianism, Kantian ethics (the categorical 
imperative), virtue theory, prima-facie principles, and Rawls’ 
veil of ignorance. The students were requested to answer in 
textual form. In order to find out whether they intended to 
use the theories in real-life moral conflicts we asked them to 
give a response to the following open-ended question: 
“If you confronted the same problem in real life what 
theories would you use in solving it, and which ones 
would you not use? (Would you refrain from using 
theories?) Give arguments for your response.” 
The subjects were students on an elective Ethics for 
Computer Professionals (2cr) course, given at the 
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Department of Computer Science and Information Systems, 
University of Jyväskylä, Finland. The study was conducted 
during the academic years of 2004 and 2005, and 41 and 34 
students, respectively, took part. 
We subjected the students’ textual responses to the 
above question to phenomenographic analysis. Phenomenog-
raphy and the associated data analysis are explained next.  
 
3.2 Phenomenography 
The phenomenographic research method was developed at 
Gothenburg University in order to study the human 
understanding of specific phenomena (Marton, 1992). The 
aim of the approach is to identify and describe qualitative 
variation in individuals' experiences of their reality (Marton, 
1986, 31). The phenomenographic researcher aims to attain a 
holistic view of a selected phenomenon, and - according to 
Marton (1995, 178) - this is possible because there are a 
limited number of qualitatively different ways of 
experiencing it. Thus, it is possible to obtain a holistic view 
of individuals' conceptions of the phenomenon under study. 
What is characteristic of the approach is the focus on 
arriving at conceptualizations that are faithful to the 
individuals’ experience. These conceptions, which are 
typically gathered in interviews, are then categorized, and 
the relations between the categories are further explored 
(Francis 1993, 69). The researcher thus seeks qualitatively 
different ways of experiencing the phenomena regardless of 
whether the differences are between or within individuals. 
He or she thus attempts to reach a so-called second-order 
perspective on the investigated aspect of the reality by 
describing the conceptions of a group of individuals - instead 
of taking the first-order approach and describing the reality 





Figure 1. The first- and second-order perspectives 
(Uljens 1991; Järvinen 2001) 
 
Phenomenography as a method is closer to abductive than to 
inductive logic (Isomäki, 2002, 51). In the former the theory 
is created from the empirical data following a guiding 
principle or some kinds of clues found in the scientific 
literature, for example, whereas in the latter the theory is 
created from the empirical data without a priori assumptions. 
Phenomenographic studies feature a priori assumptions 
(ibid.).  
The approach has been used in studies concerning 
conceptions of matter (Renström, 1988), and systems 
designers’ conceptions of the human being (Isomäki 2002), 
for example. A collection of phenomenographic research is 




3.3 Data analysis in phenomenography 
The aim of a phenomenographic study is to differentiate, 
group and interrelate data and then to determine the resulting 
categories of description (Svensson and Theman, 1983; 
Kaapu et al. 2006). A category may include several concepts, 
which may be compared with each other. The aim is then to 
explore relations between the obtained categories in order to 
derive a meaningful structural model of the conceptions 
(Francis, 1993, 74). This search for a meaningful structure 
demands identification of the distinguishing features of the 
categories and the determination of logical or other relations 
between them. There are variations in ways of analysing data 
transcripts (e.g., interview transcripts, questionnaire 
responses or even contents of pictures). One possibility is to 
extract quotations and to deal with them away from the 
transcripts, and another is to keep the context of the citations 
in mind (the whole interview transcript, for example) 
(Bowden, 1994, 11). The next step is to shift attention to the 
meanings embedded within the quotations. Interest is 
focused on the ‘pool of meanings’ rather than on what the 
individual interviewees or respondents have said. As a result 
of this work the citations are arranged and rearranged, and 
narrowed down into categories. It is not necessary to try to 
obtain a comprehensive account of the conceptions of each 
individual (Francis, 1993). However, the researcher should 
be able to show that no more categories would emerge if the 
selected sample size were increased. Sandberg (2000) 
observed that after 20 interviews the conceptions start to 
saturate. 
There are characteristics of phenomenography that 
make it a promising method for the purposes of this study. 
First, the aim is to show qualitative variation in the 
perceptions of individuals in a certain population (Järvinen, 
2007). In practice the most obvious contribution of the 
method is that it makes it possible to find different views of 
the phenomenon under scrutiny (Kaapu et al. 2006). In this 
study we obtained a collective description of students’ 
perceptions of their intended use of theories of ethics in real 
life. This information is needed in IS ethics teaching in order 
to support students in developing their critical-thinking 
skills. The more fine-grained our results are, the more in-
depth understanding we may achieve. Secondly, an 
individual’s morality is subject to development (e.g., 
Kohlberg, 1981; Rest, 1994), and could therefore be studied 
from the perspective of learning, for which 
phenomenography is widely used (e.g., Berglund, 2005). 
 
3.4 Analysis of the students’ responses 
The students’ responses regarding their intended use of 
theories of ethics were subjected to phenomenographic 
analysis. They typically comprised five to ten sentences 
describing their perceptions, and our attempt to determine a 
meaningful structure was iterative in nature. We started to 
search for the different ways of using theories of ethics in 
resolving moral conflicts in the students’ perceptions. Our 
goal was to determine the developmental levels in the 
responses. First, it became evident from many of them that 
certain students declined to use theories of ethics at all, and 
relied on their intuition or consciousness. On the other hand, 
some of them directly referred to the use of theories for 
resolving conflicts. Many of the responses were quite 
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mechanical in nature, suggesting the use of a single theory to 
find a solution. However, some students compared theories 
and indicated that they would use a certain one and avoid 
using another. Many stated that if they really had to use a 
theory (as the question implied) they would use a particular 
one or more, but they also wrote that if they were free to use 
a theory or not they would not use any theory and would rely 
on their intuition. Moreover, many seemed to assume that 
they would use theories unconsciously, or that their own 
intuition might follow some theory without their being aware 
of it. This diversity in responses made the analysis process 
iterative in nature, and we went back and forth in our 
interpretations. In addition, there was evidence in some of 
the responses of thoughts that could be categorized on more 
than one level (e.g., refraining from using theories and at the 
same time indicating the use of a certain one). Indeed, there 
were different ways of determining the developmental levels 
in the students’ perceptions. One possibility was to assess the 
number of theories they would use: none, one or many. 
However, this interpretation was very mechanical and would 
not give insights into moral-conflict resolution. We 
concluded that an interpretation that took into account the 
interplay between intuition and the given theories was the 
most relevant: the use of any given methodological tool 
would strengthen the conflict-resolution process, and we 
therefore concluded that the more students integrate theories 
into their intuition the more developed the process will be. 
Consciously applying theories of ethics along with intuitive 
deliberation represents more developed thinking than relying 
on intuitive thinking alone, for example. In cases in which 
the student response indicated thinking applicable to more 
than one level we added it to the sum of the more developed 
level. There were slight hints of higher-level thinking in 
some of the responses, which we included in the more 
immature level. A collective description of the students’ use 
of ethics theories is given next. 
 
4. RESULTS: THE INTENDED USE OF THEORIES 
OF ETHICS IN REAL LIFE 
 
The following collective description of students’ intended 
use of ethics theories in real-life moral conflicts is the result 
of phenomenographic analysis, and constitutes four 
developmental levels describing how they intended to use 
the theories alongside their intuition (Table 1). 
We based the first level on moral-conflict resolution 
purely through intuition, without the use of any ethics theory, 
whereas the second incorporates its possible latent use in 
intuitive deliberation. The third level reflects the conscious 
use of theories to support intuitive deliberation, and the 
fourth level implies their internalised use. The first level 
represents the lowest and the fourth the highest stage of 
maturity. The levels are presented below. 
 
Level 1: Rejection of theories of ethics 
On this level the students expressed trust in their intuition, 
consciousness or feelings in their decision-making with 
regard to moral conflicts. They claimed that ethics theories 
would be of no help, and may also have harbored an 
indifferent or even hostile attitude towards them. An 
example follows: 
”The use of theories of ethics in resolving a moral 
problem was an entirely new experience and it was 
surprising to realize how different theories lead to 
different solutions. I wouldn’t use them in a real-life 
situation, mainly because I don’t have enough 
experience of doing so, and some of the theories are 
quite rigid. I trust my common sense and my own 
deliberation more than these theories.” 
 




of theories of 
ethics 
The student trusts his or 
her intuition, 
consciousness or feelings. 
17.3% (13) 
2. Latent use 




The student recognizes 
that theories of ethics may 
be latently present in his 










The student consciously 
uses ethics theory or 




use of theories 
of ethics 
The student has 
internalized the use of 
theories of ethics to such 
an extent that he or she 
does not need consciously 
to deliberate on their use. 
5.3% (4) 
Table 1. The developing role of theories of ethics in 
relation to intuition (n=75) 
 
Level 2: Latent use of theories of ethics  
On this level the students stated that they would not 
consciously use theories of ethics, but they also admitted that 
such theories might be latently in evidence in their 
deliberations. They might therefore follow the idea of a 
theory without being aware of it. The potential usefulness of 
the theories is recognized in these expressions, which 
therefore represent more developed thinking than those on 
the previous level. Examples follow: 
“Probably I wouldn’t use any theory – at least not 
consciously. I would do what felt right. But probably 
behind the ‘feel right’ would be some kind of theory”.  
 
“If I confronted such a situation I wouldn’t actively 
consider any theories, but no doubt I would 
unconsciously apply utilitarianism and prima-facie 
principles.” 
 
“I would use prima-facie theory. In my view people 
have many duties and should make decisions as the 
situation unfolds. … In this case, Kant’s theory is too 
strict and virtue ethics is too loose.” 
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Level 3: Conscious use of ethics theory to support 
intuitive deliberation 
Students on this level would consciously use one or multiple 
theories of ethics as a decision-making aid, in addition to 
intuition. They might use the theory to find new insights and 
thus complement what their intuition told them. Whereas on 
the previous level the theories were latently present, on this 
level they are consciously used as an aid in resolving moral 
conflicts. Some students even stated that consciousness was 
not enough in difficult situations, and that theories of ethics 
could be of help. Two examples follow: 
  
“Perhaps the best solution would be to mix the 
theories with so-called intuition. In this way one might 
come up with the best solution for oneself and one’s 
values. Using the theories and studying them would 
bring a new perspective to one’s values and thoughts.” 
 
“If I confronted this situation in real life I wouldn’t 
necessarily first deliberate on what each philosophical 
theory had to say, or on how the theories approached 
the solving of moral problems. However, theoretical 
knowledge could be of help, although no particular 
theory would offer any exact resolution….” 
 
Level 4: Internalised use of theories of ethics 
Student expressions on this level referred to the need to 
internalise theories of ethics in order to apply them in the 
most efficient way. Some students indicated that they would 
need more experience in applying the theories before they 
could use them effectively, which suggests that they 
recognised that the use of multiple theories was not enough: 
they needed to use them repeatedly in order to derive the 
most benefit in terms of getting alternative solutions. Then 
again, one may not be aware of using the theories when one 
has internalised them. This was the most mature level found 
in the students’ responses. An example follows: 
 
“Most probably mixing them all [theories] – in a way 
one unconsciously uses them all when solving 
problems (and no doubt the more you deliberate on 
these issues the more you learn to apply the theories 
and therefore the more you benefit). But rarely in 
every-day life do you use theories of ethics to 




We studied students’ (n=75) perceptions of the applicability 
of theories of ethics. To our knowledge this was the first 
study to focus on the impact of IS ethics teaching on student 
thinking. To be more precise, we would like to highlight five 
findings based on our empirical results. 
First, 17.3 per cent of the students trusted their intuition, 
consciousness or feelings more than theories of ethics. We 
called this intuitive decision-making, and it resembles 
intuitive-level thinking in terms of R.M Hare’s (1981) theory 
of levels of moral thinking. Our findings therefore provide 
support for Hare’s theory. The refusal of these students to 
use such theories in moral decision-making may not come as 
a surprise as the teaching intervention was minimal - a two-
hour lecture and an assignment given afterwards. Moreover, 
as Hare (1981) argues, it is common to find people on this 
level. The rejection of theories resembles particularism, a 
doctrine claiming that because moral conflicts are contextual 
and complex using moral rules or principles is inappropriate 
in resolving them (DeMarco 1996, 26). A single rule does 
not provide enough guidance in complex situations (e.g., do 
not lie), and if we accepted multiple principles (e.g., 
upholding justice and caring at the same time) they would 
conflict with each other. It is further maintained that there 
should be no principles in an ethical system, and that we 
should make judgments in reaction to each individual case. 
Particularism, in fact, faces criticism with regard to its lack 
of guidance in resolving moral conflicts (ibid., 41-47). 
According to its opponents, it is impossible to leave morality 
up to individual judgment without demanding that similar 
cases should be judged similarly: rules and principles have a 
significant role in upholding a reliable system. Hence, 
theories of ethics have a significant role in moral decision-
making and ethics teaching. In fact, R.M. Hare’s (1963, 
1981) interpretation of Kant, his own theory of Universal 
Prescriptivism, and Rawls’ Theory of Justice suggest that 
one could first form a set of general moral principles, and 
then in a situation of conflict (or just to find out whether 
these moral principles made sense), one could test them 
according to the universality thesis or utilitarianism, and 
come up with refined principles.  
Second, 21.3 per cent of the students recognised that 
theories of ethics may be latently present in their intuitive 
deliberation. We interpreted this to mean that some of the 
theories may be part of their tacit knowledge, which is 
informal and unstructured and difficult to express (Nonaka et 
al. 2000). Indeed, some characteristics of certain theories, 
utilitarianism for example, might have been present in their 
thinking before the teaching intervention took place.  
Third, a further 56 per cent of the students consciously 
used one or several theories of ethics to support their 
intuitive deliberation. Their conscious use of such theories, 
in addition to following their intuition or conscience, implies 
that some of them understood that explicitly expressed 
knowledge (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995) could be combined 
with tacit knowledge: one is able consciously to evaluate 
one’s first intuitive solutions to moral problems and then 
sharpen one’s analysis with the help of theories of ethics. 
This finding also has features in common with Hare’s (1981) 
critical-level thinking, and therefore it provides empirical 
support for his theory on levels of moral thinking.  
Fourth, 5.3 per cent of the students thought that they 
had to use theories of ethics repeatedly in order to internalise 
them. While the majority understood the significance of 
mixing theories in order to get a full picture of potential 
solutions, only a few had realised the need for constant 
practice in conflict resolution according to the various 
theories in order to internalise them.  
Fifth, the respondents liked the theories that supported 
their viewpoint. Many stated that they found a particular 
theory useful or easy to use because it reflected their way of 
thinking. Students should be encouraged to adopt alternative 
viewpoints in order to develop new insights. This finding 
also suggests that even a few hour-long lectures on IS ethics 
could have a positive effect on their thinking. 
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5.1 Limitations of the research 
This study carries the typical limitations. First, since the 
respondents answered through email they were not 
anonymous, and may not have been as frank as they 
otherwise would have been. It could be argued that 
interviewing would have been a better way of collecting the 
data because it allows additional questions to be asked. In 
our view, however, written answers have certain strengths 
over interviews: interviewees need to answer right away, 
while in our case the students had time to consider their 
responses. However, in interviewing it is possible to ask 
further questions, which is not practical in email surveys. 
Second, the fact that we did not study students’ prior 
knowledge of theories of ethics is a limitation. Students may 
have received education on theories of ethics in high school, 
for example. 
Internal validity is also a common concern in qualitative 
research (Lacity and Janson, 1994). In order to guarantee 
validity we conducted the data analysis as described in 
Section 3. This kind of peer reviewing of the categories and 
reaching agreement about them confirms their internal 
validity. As for Lacity and Janson’s (1994) criterion, 
according to which validity rests on acceptance by the 
scientific community, we can only leave this for the reader to 
decide. However, we have cited verbatim from the subjects’ 
texts to show support for our analysis. 
 
5.2 Implications for IS ethics teaching and research 
We would like to highlight five recommendations for IS 
ethics teaching and research on the basis of our findings.  
 
Recommendation 1: A critical evaluation of one’s 
conscience as an ethical guiding light  
 
The fact that 17.3 per cent of the students trusted their 
intuition or conscience raises a question about their ability to 
employ critical reasoning in Hare’s (1981) terms. According 
to Ruggiero (1997, 37), real moral growth requires 
examination of one’s conscience and evaluation of its 
promptings, and conscience is an important single guide in 
human behaviour but it is not an infallible moral guide. Hare 
(1981) agrees: our intuitions are not reliable as they only 
reflect our upbringing and education. If we accepted 
intuitions as means of making ethical decisions we would 
end up in a situation in which ‘anything goes’. What is a 
cause for concern in the results of this study is that only 56 
per cent of the students indicated that they would combine 
theories of ethics with their intuition, i.e., engage in critical 
thinking in Hare’s (1981) terms. Given the criticism 
expressed in the literature concerning the conscience, these 
results mean that students should be sensitised to its nature 
and its probable biased effect on ethical decision-making. 
We therefore suggest that teachers go through the dangers of 
relying on intuition, as Hare suggests.  
 
Recommendation 2: Use constructivism as a background 
theory in developing ethics teaching in IS 
 
In the light of the students’ weak understanding of the 
importance of developing skills for resolving moral conflicts, 
the implication is that a learning theory that supports 
learning skills should be adopted. Constructivism as an 
educational approach is recommended as a possible solution: 
learning is perceived not as the passive receiving of 
information, but as a continuous process of constructing and 
reconstructing conceptions of phenomena (e.g., Duffy and 
Jonassen, 1992; Steffe and Gale 1995). The situational 
nature of learning is taken into account, and authentic or 
simulated environments are preferred. The learning process 
is characterised by the use of problem solving, the active 
processing of information, and the production of concrete 
artefacts along the way. The role of the teacher is to support 
and facilitate the learning process, assessment procedures are 
embedded in it, and the focus in the assessment is on 
authentic tasks. In terms of ethics education in IS this would 
mean that students should be supported in resolving the real-
life moral conflicts they confront, and teachers should 
provide assistance in terms of supporting them in their 
critical thinking (Hare 1981) by teaching theories of ethics 
and their application, for example. Integrating this kind of IS 
ethics teaching into practical training or real-life-oriented 
project courses might motivate them more than resolving 
moral conflicts concerning student life. 
 
Recommendation 3: The exemplary application of theories 
of ethics to show their strengths and weaknesses in resolving 
moral conflicts 
 
Some students perceived the use of theories of ethics as 
complex and unclear. Exemplary application of the theories 
should focus on different conflicts in order to foster 
understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of each 
theory. In addition, all major theories should be used to 
avoid the mistaken impression that a single one will suffice. 
This also means that tolerance of uncertainty when 
confronting and resolving moral problems should be 
encouraged in IS ethics teaching. 
 
Recommendation 4: Integrate theories of ethics into IS ethics 
courses 
 
Of our respondents, 56 per cent consciously used ethics 
theory to support their intuitive deliberation. These students 
thus considered these theories valuable tools, along with 
their intuition, in resolving moral conflicts, which suggests 
that even a brief theoretical introduction is useful. Our 
findings thus support the view that theories of ethics should 
be included in IS education (Gorgone et al. 2000). 
 
Recommendation 5: Research on the effects of ethics 
theories on real-life moral conflicts 
 
Whereas our results shed new light on the intended use of 
theories of ethics in real life, future research should focus on 
the long-term implications of teaching such theories. Does 
the teaching intervention support students’ moral 
development? In order to find this out we should first know 
how well they understand the theories, what mistakes they 
typically make in applying them, and what kind of 
educational interventions are the most efficient in terms of 
facilitating their learning. Second, future research is needed 
concerning the effects of teaching the theories on the 
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processes of moral behaviour (moral sensitivity, moral 
judgment, moral motivation, and moral character; Rest 
1994). Does the teaching of ethics theories affect the 
problem-solving strategies adopted in moral conflicts (moral 




Although, ethics is recognised as a vital part of IS curricula, 
little is known about whether learners find the theories useful 
and usable in solving ethical problems. In an attempt to 
redress this situation in this interpretive study, we analysed 
students’ (n=75) perceptions of their intended real-life use of 
these theories in resolving moral conflicts. The results 
revealed four levels of intended use: rejection (the student 
trusts his or her intuition, consciousness or feelings instead 
of the theories), latent use (the student recognises that the 
theories may be latently present in their intuitive 
deliberation), conscious use (the student uses the theories to 
support their intuitive deliberation), and internalised use (the 
student has internalised the theories to such an extent that he 
or she does not need to consciously steer his or her 
deliberation to their use). On the basis of these findings we 
offer five recommendations to IS educators: (1) 
constructivism as an educational approach should be adopted 
in developing IS ethics teaching; (2) theories of ethics should 
be integrated into the contents of IS ethics courses, and 
students should be exposed to exemplary applications that 
show their strengths and weaknesses in resolving moral 
conflicts; (3) students should also be encouraged to critically 
consider their conscience, which is not an error-free guide in 
moral decision-making; (4) finally, future research should 
consider how the theories of ethics should be taught and how 
students apply them (e.g., what mistakes students make in 
applying the theories). In addition, (5) the effects of teaching 
of the theories of ethics on students’ moral thinking and 
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